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Abstract 
 
Geomagnetic storms (GMS) can seriously affect high voltage power transmission grids. More specifically, GMS can 
inject geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) into the power network, thus causing instabilities and eventually 
leading to grid collapse. Since GMS are expected to cause more pronounced disturbances at high latitudes, this 
report addresses the effects of GMS on the Scandinavian interconnected power transmission grid, including 
Finland, Sweden and Norway. By applying 100-year-benchmark scenarios, we analyzed potential space-weather 
triggered voltage instabilities in the power grid considering mono-phase transformers, which are known to be 
more vulnerable to GIC injection, and three phase transformers, which are less vulnerable. 
Our simulations indicate that the three-phase configuration of the network is significantly more robust than the 
mono-phase one. For a system with only three-phase transformers, the likelihood of grid collapse is very low, and 
collapse only occurs for the worst-case scenario with extremely high geoelectric field intensities. Our results 
indicate that lines that experience higher reactive power losses during normal operation are more likely to 
increase losses during a GMS event. According to our study, the portion of the Scandinavian interconnected 
power transmission grid most vulnerable to extreme space weather is the part where the highest reactive losses in 
transmission lines and in voltage magnitudes are observed. This corresponds to the southern parts of Sweden and 
Norway. 
In the near future, this study will be extended to assess the risk of extreme space weather for larger portions of the 
EU power grid. 
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Abstract 
Geomagnetic storms (GMS) can seriously affect high voltage power transmission grids. More 
specifically, GMS can induce quasi-DC currents, known as geomagnetically induced currents (GICs), 
which enter the power network, thus causing instabilities and eventually leading to grid collapse. 
High-voltage power transformers are particularly susceptible to GIC impact: the injection of DC-
currents drives transformers into their saturation regime, triggering undesired effects throughout 
the grid and, in case of intense currents, seriously damaging transformers. 
Since GMS are expected to cause more pronounced disturbances at high latitudes, this report 
addresses the effects of GMS on the Scandinavian interconnected power transmission grid, including 
Finland, Sweden and Norway. By applying 100-year-benchmark scenarios, we analyzed potential 
space-weather triggered voltage instabilities in the power grid considering mono-phase 
transformers, which are known to be more vulnerable to GIC injection, and three phase 
transformers, which are less vulnerable. 
Our analysis shows how the electric-field magnitudes and the power line orientation with respect to 
the geomagnetic field can inject currents of different intensities into the system and how their effect 
on the grid is susceptible to the power flow that drives GICs through the systems. GIC-induced 
instabilities in the system superimposed on the load flow increase the possibility for the system to 
collapse. 
Our simulations indicate that the three-phase configuration of the network is significantly more 
robust than the mono-phase one. For a system with only three-phase transformers, the likelihood of 
grid collapse is very low, and collapse only occurs for the worst-case scenario with extremely high 
geoelectric field intensities. Our results indicate that lines that experience higher reactive power 
losses during normal operation are more likely to increase losses during a GMS event. According to 
our study, the portion of the Scandinavian interconnected power transmission grid most vulnerable 
to extreme space weather is the part where the highest reactive losses in transmission lines and in 
voltage magnitudes are observed. This corresponds to the southern parts of Sweden and Norway. 
In the near future, this study will be extended to assess the risk of extreme space weather for larger 
portions of the EU power grid.  
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1. Introduction 
 
On 17 March 2015, the Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC) of NOAA issued the following space 
weather advisory (NOAA, 2015):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A severe geomagnetic storm (GMS) following a coronal mass ejection (CME) impact occurred which 
was classified at level G4 out of a scale of only five levels. Its impact on Earth caused an induced 
electric field of 200 mV/km, as calculated for New England power plant locations (NOAA, 2015). To 
give an idea of the intensity of the storm, the measured induced electric field was a tenth of the 
March 13, 1989 values, which caused a 9-hour blackout for the entire Québec region. This time, no 
power failures were reported.  
The critical infrastructure that society has become most reliant on is the power grid. Power networks 
play a vital role in everyday life either as a standalone critical infrastructure providing electrical 
power but also as a service provider to many other critical infrastructures that critically rely on the 
power grid. In a report published by Kappenman (2010), it is claimed that a severe geomagnetic 
storm, like the Carrington event in 1859, could severely affect and damage the power grid, creating a 
dark era for our society. The question that arises is: are power transmission grids robust against 
geomagnetic storm impacts?  
The aim of this work is to understand if power grids are stable and robust against space weather. In 
a previous report (Piccinelli and Krausmann, 2014) we addressed the problem by identifying the 
physical and technological part of the issue and introducing a complex network theory approach in 
order to understand the behavior of the power transmission grid. In this report, we apply our 
approach to the Scandinavian interconnected 400kV power transmission grid to understand the 
behavior of the network in case of extreme space weather events.  
Space Weather Message Code: ALTK08 
Serial Number: 18 
Issue Time: 2015 Mar 17 1401 UTC 
 
ALERT: geomagnetic K-index of 8 
Threshold Reached: 2015 Mar 17 1358 UTC 
Synoptic Period: 1200 – 1500 UTC 
 
Active Warning: Yes 
NOAA Scale: G4 – Severe 
 
Potential Impacts: Area of impact primarily poleward of 45 degree 
Geomagnetic Latitude. 
Induced Currents – Possible widespread voltage control problems and some 
protective systems may mistakenly trip out key assets from the power 
grid. Induced pipelines currents intensify […]. 
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2. Model and failure modes  
2.1 Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) 
This section briefly summarizes the physical phenomenon at the origin of the formation of GICs and 
reviews the most important factors that cause a power transmission grid to suffer from a GMS 
impact. The effects of geomagnetic storms on a power grid are shown in Figure 1. 
 
                                    
Figure 1. Schematic of the formation of geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) and of how they enter power 
grids (NOAA, 2015). 
 
Geomagnetic storms appear on Earth as electrojets. These are flows of particles, which fluctuate in 
the ionosphere. They cause a time variation of the terrestrial magnetic field, which induces a voltage 
potential on the surface of the Earth. When such a potential “encounters” a closed circuit, it induces 
currents to flow in it. Power transmission grids are networks of long transmission lines and stations 
linked to the ground through grounded connections. Together with the ground, transmission lines 
form closed loops which, when being exposed to an electric potential, experience the induction of 
currents. This is the application of the well-known Faraday law: a time-varying magnetic field induces 
a current to flow in a closed loop. 
When a geomagnetic storm hits the Earth, geomagnetically induced currents are formed and can 
enter the power transmission grids. The degree to which the geomagnetic storm affects the power 
system and its equipment depends on several factors. These include (NERC, 2012): 
• Magnitude and orientation of the magnetic field 
• Geomagnetic latitude 
• Geology of the local area, including the electrical conductivity of the soil 
• Proximity to an ocean or large water bodies  
• Directional orientation, resistance and length of transmission lines 
• Design of the power system and its equipment 
We can separate these factors into two main classes: geo-physical factors, which are the first four 
points, and technical factors.  
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The site where the grounded stations are located and their geomagnetic characteristics are 
extremely important. Since the geomagnetic field deviates the particles coming from the Sun 
towards the poles, northern latitudes will be more affected by the electrojets. Moreover, since the 
ground acts as a conductor, the electrical conductivity of the soil determines how much current will 
enter the station: a conductive soil will limit the quantity of current entering the power grid; in 
contrast, a less conductive ground will allow more induced current to enter the system. The 
presence of an ocean or of a large body of water can also influence the ground conductivity, 
increasing the quantity of currents entering the system. 
The technical factors that concern the engineered system are its structure, in terms of orientation 
and electrical characteristics of the transmission lines, and the characteristics of its components.  
GMSs can affect the components and the operation of power systems through a wide range of 
impacts. Effects with minor severity may be the tripping of electrical equipment or control 
malfunctions. Major GMSs may trigger voltage and reactive power fluctuations, local disruption of 
service, equipment failure and potential voltage instability that can potentially result in the 
uncontrolled cascading of the bulk power system. 
2.2 Transformers 
Transformers are among the power grid components that are most susceptible to GIC impact. They 
are also among the most important components of the grid: since their function is to allow the 
transformation of a precise quantity of voltage, each transformer is specifically designed for a 
certain location of the system. The procedure of designing, producing, transporting and installing a 
transformer is costly and time-consuming and may require from twelve up to eighteen months. It is 
not feasible to keep in stock too many reserve transformers, so it is of the utmost importance for the 
stakeholders and operators to protect transformers from damage due to GICs. 
GICs are quasi-DC currents that can cause numerous problems when entering the power grid. 
Transformers are particularly susceptible to GIC impact, as they are not designed to handle the DC 
current. In fact, almost all power grid equipment and operational problems due to space weather 
arise from disturbed transformer performance, which is driven into half-cycle saturation by the GIC. 
As a consequence, the normally nearly linear relationship between input and output voltages and 
currents is shifted into a non-linear region. A number of secondary effects follow, such as increased 
reactive power consumption and the injection of even and odd harmonics into the power system. 
These harmonics cause even less compensating reactive power to be available, which can eventually 
lead to grid collapse (Molinski, 2002). Boteler (2001) notes that the situation is worse for power grids 
with long transmission lines, e.g. in the range of hundreds of kilometers, because longer lines have 
higher voltage support requirements. 
The following sections briefly describe the main damage and failure modes associated with GIC 
loading in power grids. 
Transformer saturation 
Power transformers are used for stepping up voltage levels for electricity transport in transmission 
lines or reducing the voltage for electricity distribution to the customers. They use steel cores and 
are designed to be extremely efficient. As shown in Figure 2 (left), transformers usually operate in 
the linear range of their magnetic characteristic, which corresponds to an exciting current of only a 
few Amperes of AC. If GICs flow in the system, the operating point on the steel core saturation curve 
is shifted towards the nonlinear portion of the characteristic (Figure2 right). Consequently, 
saturation occurs during one half of the cycle, causing a very high and asymmetrical exciting current 
(10-15% or more of the rated load current) to be drawn by the transformer (Ngnegueu et al, 2012).  
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Figure 2. Relationship of exciting current and magnetic flux under normal operating conditions (left) 
and in the presence of GICs (right) (Molinski, 2002). 
 
Different transformer types are impacted differently by half-cycle saturation (Kappenman, 2010). 
Single-phase transformers, in particular, are more at risk than three-phase transformers because the 
quasi DC flux induced by the GIC can flow directly in the core. Furthermore, shell-type transformers 
are at greater risk than core-type transformers while autotransformers are particularly susceptible 
(Kappenman, 2010).  
Reactive power losses 
Transformers saturated by GIC loading have a higher reactive power consumption, which increases 
linearly with GIC magnitude (Albertson, 1973; Walling and Kahn, 1991). Single-phase transformers 
consume the largest amount of reactive power. A 90° voltage shift caused by the excitation current 
during saturation creates a reactive power demand from the power system. As a consequence, there 
may be drops in system voltage and the stability margins may decrease significantly because 
additional reactive power is being consumed. The situation is exacerbated if voltage support devices 
trip during GIC events (Molinski, 2002) due to the injection of harmonics into the system. 
Harmonics 
When a transformer is driven into half-cycle saturation, the exciting currents contain harmonics of 
various orders (fundamental, 2nd, 3rd, etc.), giving rise to complex current patterns. In case of very 
large GIC levels, the contribution of harmonics declines, especially at the higher orders, since the 
transformer is operating in a completely linear, although saturated, region of its magnetizing curve 
(Molinski, 2002). Power grids are generally designed to cope with odd harmonics (e.g. 3rd). However, 
they can be overwhelmed by even harmonics (e.g. negative sequence 2nd harmonic) because they 
are usually not expected during power operations (Molinski, 2002). False neutral overcurrent relay 
actuation may be the consequence. Moreover, harmonic currents can also cause additional series 
losses in e.g. circuit breakers and filter banks.  
Transformer overheating 
In case of transformer saturation most of the excess magnetic flux flows externally to the core into 
the transformer tank, where currents are created and localized tank wall heating with temperatures 
reaching 175°C can occur (Kappenman, 1996). If a transformer is repeatedly exposed to heating due 
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to GIC loading, it can lead to cumulative insulation damage, accelerated ageing and eventually 
transformer failure (Koen and Gaunt, 2003). Unfortunately, in such cases it is usually not 
straightforward to relate cause and effect, so the real cause of transformer failure could be 
attributed to other reasons.  
Generator overheating 
Although no serious generator damage due to GMSs has been documented so far, there is at least 
theoretically some potential for damage (Molinski, 2002). Generators are usually shielded from 
direct GIC impact but they can still be affected by harmonics and voltage unbalance caused by 
transformer saturation. If harmonic currents enter the generator, excessive heating and mechanical 
vibrations can result. Moreover, the energy of the higher harmonic orders is concentrated near the 
rotor surface, which can also heat up and create a crack initiation site. As is the case for transformer 
heating, these phenomena may diminish the useful life of a generator, although the damage might 
not be immediately apparent and a potential failure at a later stage not necessarily attributed to GIC 
impact.  
Protection relay tripping 
In case of GIC flows, the harmonic content of the power system increases. With modern digital 
relays measuring the peak current value to monitor the status of the system, they are sensitive to 
tripping by harmonics. These false trips can then indirectly trigger a cascading failure of the power 
system. The relays’ set current can be adjusted to accommodate the higher harmonics during GID 
impact and reduce the risk of false trips. However, this comes at the cost of lower protection levels 
(FEN, 2013).  
Power systems increasingly depend on reactive power compensators and shunt capacitor banks for 
voltage control. Generally, shunt capacitors are grounded and have protection against unbalanced 
operation via neutral overcurrent relays. However, these capacitors banks are vulnerable to false 
trips during GMSs because of the capacitor’s low impedance at the associated harmonic frequencies. 
Several power grid operators have upgraded or even replaced their neutral overcurrent unbalance 
protection to reduce the likelihood of false trips (IEEE, 1993).  
The three primary effects of GICs on transformers and hence on power systems and their 
consequences is outlined in Figure 3. 
The aim of this report is the study of the behavior of the power grid affected by a GMS: we are 
looking at the system as a whole so we focus our attention on the increase of reactive losses as the 
primary cause of collapse for the grid.  
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Figure 3. Overview of power system impact of GIC representing the effects of half-cycle saturation and their 
consequences. 
 
3. Effects of geomagnetic storms on the Scandinavian 
interconnected power grid 
In this section, we discuss the effects of GMS on power grids that connect Finland, Sweden and 
Norway. We will refine the benchmark model of the grid, which is a 17 node-Finnish grid, expand it 
and extend the analysis to cover also the Swedish and Norwegian 400 kV power transmission 
network. 
3.1 GMS scenarios 
Satellites providing timely space weather information and a network of magnetic observatories and 
distributed magnetometers monitoring Earth’s magnetic field data in real time provide early 
indications of initiating solar storm events. Warnings can be received as short as 30 minutes before 
the beginning of impending geomagnetic storms. Nevertheless, no mathematical model is able to 
predict when a GMS will take place during a solar cycle and how intense it will be. In order to assess 
system performance during a low probability, high magnitude GMS event, a benchmark 
geomagnetic disturbance event was proposed by Pulkkinen et al. (2012). The model was completed 
using 10-second sampling of geomagnetic data covering more than one solar cycle and has the 
following characteristics: 
• Earth’s conductivity influences the electric field on the surface of the Earth, so we need to 
take it into account when calculating the electric field and resulting GICs. The benchmark 
model considers two earth conductivity scenarios, which represent two realistic extremes of 
a scale representing all possible type of soils: a conductive and a resistive ground structure; 
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• The scenarios also account for the different latitudes at which GMS have different intensity: 
the highest peaks are recorded at northern latitudes (above 60 degree of geomagnetic 
latitude), corresponding to the Scandinavian region, while smaller intensities are recorded at 
lower latitudes, corresponding to continental Europe. 
The resulting four scenarios are summarized in Table I:  
 
Scenario A  
|E|=20 V/Km 
High Latitude 
Low Conductivity 
 
Scenario B
|E|=5 V/Km 
High Latitude 
High Conductivity 
 
 
Scenario C 
|E|=2 V/Km 
Low Latitude 
Low Conductivity 
Scenario D 
|E|=0.5 V/Km 
Low Latitude 
High Conductivity 
 
Table I.  Schematic representation of the characteristics of the geoelectric field |E| for 100-year extreme GMS 
scenarios, as proposed by Pulkkinen et al. (2012). 
 
The largest GIC measured in the Finnish 400 KV power system is as high as 201 A (on March 24, 
1991) (Pirjola et al. 2003, 2005). Probably the largest measured GIC ever reported is 320 A in the 
Swedish power grid during the geomagnetic storm in April 2000 (Erinmez et al., 2002).  Observations 
show that although rare, GICs amplitudes of several hundreds of amperes and geoelectric field 
magnitudes of the order of 10 V/km are possible (Pulkkinen et al., 2008).  
In the study of the Scandinavian interconnected power transmission grid we considered Scenarios A 
and B which are the scenarios above the threshold geomagnetic latitude for the countries included 
in the study. Scenario A represents the resistive model associated with the largest geoelectric field 
amplitudes and consequently with the most extreme GICs (Figure 4). 
Scenario B (Figure 5) is the conducting model associated with a lower field amplitudes with the peak 
|E| = 5 V/km. 
Pulkkinen et al. (2012) derived the models referring to the Canadian ground conductivity model. 
Strictly speaking, Canadian ground models cannot simply be applied to geomagnetic observations 
from different geographical regions. However, Pulkkinen et al. (2012) contend that excluding regions 
close to strong conductivity anomalies, to a good approximation the same magnetospheric current 
will produce similar total magnetic variations at regions with different ground conductivity 
structures. 
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Figure 4.  Scenario A for resistive ground structures located at high latitudes. The upper plot on the left 
represents the northward component of the geoelectric field (EX), while the upper plot on the right represents 
the eastward component (EY). The maximum geoelectric field amplitude is |E| = 20 V/km (bottom plot).  
 
Figure 5.  Scenario B for conductive ground structures located at high latitudes. The upper plot on the left 
represents the northward component of the geoelectric field (EX), while the upper plot on the right represents 
the eastward component (EY). The maximum geoelectric field amplitude is |E| = 5 V/km (bottom plot).  
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3.2 Transformer behaviour 
To better understand how the variation in time and the variation of the direction of the field 
interacts with the behavior of the transformers in the network, we had to consider the behavior of 
the transformer from a different perspective. 
Transformers are conceived and designed to operate in AC regime. When direct currents, such as 
GICs, enter, the transformer is driven into saturation zone. The reaction of the transformer due to 
saturation has been described by many simulation methods (Lu and Liu, 1991; Walling and Kahn, 
1991). 
These methods are usually accurate but they need detailed information that is not generally 
available. 
To estimate the consumption of reactive power by the system, with only the given GICs and the 
nameplate information of the transformer, we adopt a simplified approach proposed by Dong 
(2002). We assume the following: 
- The nameplate information of the transformer is known, including the rated voltage and 
MVA, that is the output that can be delivered without exceeding specified limitations; 
- The input GIC is known and divides equally between the three phases; 
- The AC and DC flux only flow in the core. Leakage flux is ignored. 
Knowing the saturation curve of the transformer it is possible to calculate the reactive power 
consumption. 
The magnetizing curves are usually represented using piecewise linear representations, as shown in 
Figure 6. 
The coefficients ki are the slopes of the lines: they represent the inductance of the transformer that 
is its behavior in non-saturation and in saturation regime.  Ici is the current corresponding to the 
change of slope, also called the knee-point current. It can be seen that mono-phase transformers 
reach the saturation regime with lower levels of current, with respect to three-phase transformers. 
This explains their greater vulnerability to GIC impact. Experiments show that k, the empirical 
coefficient is equal to 2.8 for single phase transformers and 0.4 for three-phase three limbs 
transformers (Sokolova et al. 2014).  
3.3 The Finnish power grid – Scoping study 
In Piccinelli and Krausmann (2014), the 400 kV Finnish transmission grid model by Pirjola (2009) was 
adopted as benchmark model for the evaluation of GICs. On that occasion, a study of the topological 
properties of the system was proposed that aimed at highlighting how the structure of the system 
and its geophysical characteristics, e.g., the conductivity of the ground and the line lengths, may 
drive GICs into the system, eventually leading to collapse. A preliminary study of the behavior of the 
system in its operational mode was also carried out. A geomagnetic storm and subsequent GICs 
were considered in the power flow of the system.  
Once GICs are calculated, the effects of geomagnetic disturbances on the system are determined. As 
presented in Section 2.2, GICs primarily influence power grids by inducing saturation in 
transformers. This entails a variety of effects, among which an increase in reactive power demand at 
the nodes in which transformers are located, is predominant. The increasing in load varies linearly 
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(Dong et al., 2001) with the GIC flowing in the transformer, so given the transformer specific 
constants k, the corresponding reactive power demand can be determined.  
The conceptual scheme of the approach used is represented in Figure 7. 
        
Figure 6.  Representation of the equivalent magnetizing curve of the transformer (Dong, 2002). 
Base-AC power flow
DC induced currents
I = (U+YZ)-1J
Reactive power losses
Qloss=VkVkIgic
AC power flow
 
Figure 7.  Outline of the method employed to evaluate the load flow in the 400kV transmission grid in the 
presence of GICs. 
 
3.3.1 Static analysis 
Simulations were conducted considering a transformer for every node of the network. Since no 
information is available on the exact distribution of transformers in the network, that is type and 
number of transformers, we considered two network configurations: 1) the worst case scenario, in 
which all transformers are mono phase, the most vulnerable type of transformers with respect to 
space-weather impact, and 2) a scenario in which all transformers are three phase.  
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For our scoping study, we considered four geomagnetic storm scenarios based on work by Pirjola 
(2002) and Pulkkinen et al. (2012). Starting from |E| =1V, a typical value of for a geoelectric field 
(Pirjola, 2002), in each scenario we increased the magnitude of the field: |E|=1V, 2V, 5V and 20V. 
We considered the peak intensities proposed by Pulkkinen et al. (2012) as the highest magnitudes 
for the electric field. For each of these electric field magnitudes and for each 15-degree field 
orientation from 0 to 165 degrees, the resulting AC power flow was calculated using MATPOWER 
(2011). System collapse was assumed to have happened when the power flow calculation did not 
converge. The results for the mono-phase scenario are summarized in Table II. 
 
 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165
|E|=1V       
|E|=2V       
|E|=5V       
|E|=20V       
Table II. Schematic representation of the convergence of the power flow algorithm for the Finnish 400-kV 
power transmission grid as a function of electric field strength and orientation and assuming that all 
transformers are mono-phase. Red boxes indicate grid collapse. 
 
The voltage affecting the line depends on the electric field and on the projection of the length of the 
transmission line parallel to the direction of the electric field. We kept the geoelectric field 
magnitude uniform, therefore the varying contribution to the voltage is given by the projection of 
the “global length” of the network. Since the geometry of the network extends more in the 
northward than the eastward direction, a strong geoelectric field directed northward is expected to 
have a more pronounced impact on the network, in agreement with the results of our analysis. 
For the scenario in which we assume all transformers to be three phase, our simulations show 
convergence of the power flow. This indicates that the benchmark Finnish 400 kV grid model is 
resistant to GIC impacts under the assumed conditions of electric field strength and orientation. 
3.3.2 Dynamic analysis  
Geomagnetic storms vary with time. In order to assess the behavior of the power system under such 
conditions, the same analysis as in section 3.3.1 was carried out but considering time-dependent 
GMS scenarios. The maximum absolute values of the electric field for the different scenarios were 
the same as in the static analysis. Each value of the electric field was sampled at intervals of 10 
seconds. 
For the purpose of the dynamic analysis, we considered the time-varying scenarios A and B 
(presented in Section 3.1) and two network configurations, with only mono-phase or only three-
phase transformers. For each time step of the varying electric field, we considered the transformer 
to saturate instantaneously and applied the same simulation method outlined in Figure 7. We 
obtained convergence of the Finnish benchmark grid system for both GMS scenarios and both 
network configurations. This seems to indicate that the Finnish power grid is robust against 
geomagnetic storm impact, both if we consider only mono-phase or three-phase transformers. The 
benchmark power grid appears to be robust against solar storms even with the highest intensities of 
the electric field and this result confirms the evidence that up to now Finland has not experienced 
any failure due to geomagnetic storms (Lahtinen and Elovaara, 2002).  
15 
 
A possible explanation is that during dynamic scenarios, the geoelectric field varies its magnitude 
and direction with time. The latter in particular changes randomly, so it may happen that the angle 
between the directions of the line of the system and the electric field may not give rise to GIC 
formation and hence reactive power demand from the system, which increases the risk of voltage 
collapse.  
GICs result from the interaction between the geoelectric field and the transmission lines: their 
orientation to each other influences the GIC magnitude. Since this interaction is expressed by a 
scalar product, the more the electric field and the lines are aligned, the higher will be the generated 
GICs.  
Statistically, in the chosen scenarios, the east-west direction is the most probable direction for the 
geoelectric field. We focus the attention on the Scenario A with the highest peak intensity. Figure 8 
shows the histogram representing the distribution of the electric field orientations for Scenario A. 
Most of the GMS events have direction angles included between ± 30 degrees where zero is the 
reference point for the east-west direction.  
Transmission lines in the Finnish benchmark power grid are distributed along the different 
directions. Figure 9 shows that only 23% of the lines falls into the [-30, +30] degree interval. This 
means that the orientation of the grid is such that the effect of the GMS is limited in spite of high 
electric field intensity values.  
 
Figure 8. Histogram representing the distribution of the orientation angles of the time varying geoelectric field 
for Scenario A (the time varying components of the geoelectric field EX and EY are shown in Figure 4). Zero is 
the reference point for the East-West direction. 
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Figure 9. Histogram representing the distribution of the orientation angles of the transmission lines of the 
benchmark Finnish power grid. 
 
3.4 The Scandinavian interconnected power grid 
The Finnish study was extended to analyze the vulnerability to space weather of a power 
transmission grid model that extends over the Scandinavian region and comprises the 400kV lines-
network of Norway, Sweden and Finland. The 17-node benchmark model introduced by Pirjola 
(2009) and used in section 3.3is embedded in the extended Finnish part of the grid. The full network 
consists of 147 stations and 200 transmission lines and each station is assumed to include a 
transformer. 
3.4.1 Power grid model and assumptions 
Finland, Sweden, and Norway compose the northern part of the European power transmission grid. 
While there have been efforts to model the continental European power grid (Zhou and Bialek, 
2005), to our knowledge there are no models for the Northern European part of the grid that are 
publicly available. The only public information is available from the network topology map of the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE) shown in Figure 10 
(ENTSOE, 2015). Using the data extracted from the map, we also needed data on power generation 
or power demand for our analysis. Since these data are available only as cumulative data for total 
power generation and demand, we used population census data energy quantities to estimate the 
generation and demand on the different parts of the grid, as previously done for the Finnish power 
grid (Piccinelli and Krausmann, 2014). In accordance with Zhou and Bialek (2005), we considered the 
household power demand proportional to the population density. 
The power generation in Scandinavia is very heterogeneous in both electricity sources and 
geographic distribution of generation. Norway relies to 99% on hydro power for its electricity 
generation (SSB, 2015; Statkraft, 2015). Most hydropower plants are located in the southern part of 
17 
 
Norway. Sweden has a mix of hydropower, nuclear and other thermal power plants (SCB, 2015; SEA 
2015). Most hydropower plants are located in the middle and in the north of Sweden. Finland also 
has hydropower plants in the north but also relies on other thermal power plants (FINGRID, 2015; 
Statistics Finland, 2015). 
 
Figure 10. Map of the Scandinavian 400kV power grid. Transmission lines are approximated by straight lines, 
while stations are represented by nodes (ENTSOE, 2015). Each node is assumed to represent a transformer.  
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Most of the population lives in the southern part of the Scandinavian Peninsula. This is a 
fundamental aspect of the topology of the network, especially with respect to the length of the 
transmission lines. As it can be seen from Figure 11, the average length of the transmission lines is 
88.5 km, the longest lines being located in the central part of the network, corresponding to Sweden 
where generation plants are at a greater distance with respect to Finland and Norway.  
The line length of the network is an important parameter for GIC assessment, since the voltage that 
gives rise to geomagnetically induced currents is projected along the lines. Two topological line 
parameters are fundamental for the evaluation of the geoelectric field generated by the GMS: the 
length of the line and the line orientation angle, which determines the projection of the geoelectric 
field along the line. The longer the line and the closer the alignment between the line and the 
orientation angle of the geoelectric field, the higher will be the voltage generated by the geoelectric 
field, and therefore, the higher will be the current induced in the power system. 
 
Figure 11. Line lengths for the Scandinavian interconnected power transmission grid are represented with 
different colors: Finland is represented in green (line 1 to line 60), Sweden in blue (line 61 to line 166) and 
Norway in yellow (line 167 to line 200).  There are only few very long lines, with lengths greater than 300 km, 
all of which located in Sweden. The longest line measures 490 km. 
 
The orientation of the transmission lines in the Scandinavian interconnected power grid is shown in 
Figure 12. 
Only 33% of the lines falls into the [-30, +30] degree interval, that is the interval in which the 
majority of the electric field orientation angles are concentrated (Figure. 8). Therefore, based on the 
orientation of the grid we would expect no pronounced GMS effects.  
Similarly to our simulations for the benchmark model of the Finnish 400 kV-power grid, we assumed 
the line resistances per unit length to be 0.008 Ω/km for 400 kV lines (Viljanen et al., 2012). In 
addition, all the stations only have one transformer.  
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Figure 12. Histogram representing the distribution of the orientation angles of the transmission lines of the 
Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian power systems. 
 
3.4.2 Simulations 
In our simulations we consider only the two time-varying high latitude scenarios of Pulkkinen et al. 
(2012), which are the two scenarios with the highest geoelectric field peak values in Table I: Scenario 
A (|E|peak = 20 V/km) and Scenario B (|E|peak = 5 V/km). 
The first step is the assessment of GICs in the system according to the different scenarios. For each 
time variation of the geoelectric field (Figure 4), the system experiences varying GICs flowing 
through nodes and lines. Since GIC values are proportionally scaled with the electric field (Pirjola, 
2008), we can equally consider one of the two scenarios to understand how GICs spread throughout 
the system. Values ranging from 1 to 7 V/km have been measured in the Scandinavian region (Wik et 
al, 2009), so in Figures 13 and 14 we refer to scenario B with a geoelectric field intensity |E| = 5 
V/km. 
According to the results of our simulations for Scenario B, the highest values of GICs are of the order 
of 200 A: the highest induced current (254 A) is located at node 147 situated in Norway (Figure 13) 
and located at the edge of the system where nodes exhibit larger GIC levels. This result agrees with 
the work carried out by Pirjola (2002) and Viljanen and Pirjola (1994). The direction of GIC flows has 
no relevance on their impact: both directions may drive transformers into half-cycle saturation 
(Bernabeu, 2013). These results also agree with observations reported in Pulkkinen et al. (2008) 
according to which GIC amplitudes of several hundreds of ampere and geoelectric field magnitudes 
of the order of 10 V/km are possible, although rare. 
Figure 14 shows the induced currents through the transmission lines of the power system. In the 
specific example, the longest lines spread the highest currents through the system, because they 
happen to be aligned with the geoelectric field. This also verifies the statement that induced 
currents in transmission lines are generally clearly larger than those through nodes (Pirjola, 2002), in 
which transformers are located. 
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Figure 13. Representation of GIC computed for scenario B when the |E|= 5 V/km. The sign of the currents 
refers to the direction of the flow at the stations of the network: positive values are GICs exciting the nodes of 
system while negative values are GICs entering the nodes of the system.  
 
Figure 14. Representation of GIC flow through the lines of the network when |E| = 5 V/km. The sign refers to 
the orientation of the flow: in a transmission line connecting two nodes, e.g. node 1 and node 2, positive 
values suggest that GICs flow from node 1 to node 2; negative values suggest that GICs flow the opposite way, 
from node 2 to node 1.  
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GIC values are proportionally scaled with the electric field, so in case of Scenario A we have the same 
trend for GICs at nodes and lines, but with higher intensities. In case of extreme events with |E|peak = 
20 V/km our results indicate that GICs values at nodes and lines of the grid are increased fourfold. 
Once again, the node with the highest GIC is node 147 (1,019 A) at the edge of the network, and the 
line with the highest computed GIC (2,500 A) is line 95, located in Sweden. These extremely high 
values are the result of assuming a worst-case scenario for the electric field. 
3.4.2.1 Power flow 
The direction of the geoelectric field and the orientation of power lines affect GIC at different 
locations of the system, but the dependence is complicated by the fact that GIC induced in one part 
of the grid may flow to another. Therefore, it is important to consider how GICs interact with the 
power flow within the system. 
The base case for the AC power flow consists of the network load configuration obtained from the 
statistical data (as described in Section 3.4.1) considered in the absence of any geoelectric induced 
field, that is when |E| = 0 V/km. Calculations were implemented using the MATPOWER software 
(MATPOWER, 2011). 
Figures 15 shows the voltage magnitudes (per unit, p.u.) for the 147 buses of the Scandinavian 
interconnected transmission network, during operational mode (AC power flow), that is in the 
absence of any GMS.  
 
Figure 15. Bus voltage magnitudes during ordinary operational mode (when |E| = 0 V/km) based on network 
load configuration estimated from the data described in Section 3.4.1. The voltage ranges from Vmin = 0.95 p.u 
to Vmax = 1.05 p.u. 
 
Figure 16 shows the reactive losses experienced by the transmission lines during ordinary 
operational mode. Voltages and reactive losses for the base case of the AC load flow scenario will 
serve as a comparison for the behavior of the system during an extreme space-weather event.  
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Figure 16.  Transmission line losses of reactive power during ordinary operational mode (when |E| = 0 V/km). 
 
In Section 3.4 we already discussed that the Scandinavian interconnected network has generating 
units concentrated in few sites. Therefore, lines connecting the power plants directly to the grid 
transmit high power flow and register the highest losses during normal operations. 
In our analysis, for each scenario we run the AC power flow for the power network considering two 
different types of transformers. Since there is no public information on the distribution of each type 
of transformer in each station of the network, we consider two configurations of the network. They 
represent two extreme cases: one case, in which all transformers are mono phase, or the most 
vulnerable type, and one in which all transformers are three phase, which is a configuration more 
resistant to GICs. 
For both system configurations and for each Scenario A and B an AC power flow simulation was 
conducted as described in Figure 7. We ran the power flow simulation for each time step, 
corresponding to the 10-second interval of the geoelectric field measurement. Where transformer 
saturation was observed, we considered the transformer to saturate instantaneously. This is the 
most conservative assumption for transformer behavior (Bernabeu, 2013). After each step, we 
assumed that the system resets to an unsaturated configuration. There are two possible results: the 
power flow converges, which means that the system withstands the GMS or the power flow does 
not reach convergence, which means the system experiences a collapse. 
3.4.2.2  Case a) System with mono-phase transformers 
The network configuration with only mono-phase transformers is the worst-case assumption in 
terms of vulnerability of the network, since all transformers are of a type that is known to be 
strongly affected by GMS. Our simulations ran for the two GMS Scenario A and B, and the results 
show that the system appears to resist a Scenario B-type geomagnetic storm. Non-convergence for 
the system, that is collapse of the system, occurred only for Scenario A for which we registered 33 
collapse events. Figure 17 shows the magnitudes of the electric field during the 33 collapse events. 
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Figure 17. Representation of the magnitudes of the geoelectric fields of Scenario A, for which the system with 
mono-phase transformers collapses.   
 
For each collapse event, we estimate the variation in the bus voltages, the GIC distribution at nodes 
and the reactive losses in lines.  Among the 33 events, we consider in detail two collapse events: the 
event of collapse corresponding to the lowest value of geoelectric field that is |E| = 3.08 V/km 
(Figure 18) and the event corresponding to the peak value of the electric field, i.e. |E| = 20 V/km 
(Figure 19).   
During AC power flow, electric power is distributed throughout the network so that the nodes’ 
requested load can be supplied. Voltage magnitudes at nodes adjust in order to meet the supply. A 
collapse event can happen when the system experiences a significant voltage change throughout the 
nodes of the network. In Figure 18, the voltage1 drop induced by the GMS (red line) cannot be 
overcome to restore the voltage needed during normal operation (blue line). It can also be seen that 
some nodes require high voltage intensity (red line above the blue line), but the system is unable to 
supply it and therefore collapses. 
If we compare the voltage magnitudes during the event with the lowest geoelectric field value that 
leads to collapse, |E| = 3.08 V/km, and the peak value |E| = 20 V/km (green), (Figure 19), we still 
observe a generalized voltage drop throughout the nodes of the system.  
It is interesting to observe the magnitudes of GICs at the nodes of the network during the two 
considered collapse events (Figure 20). The figure shows the nodes at which GICs enter the system, 
but then the power flow drives them through the network. Not always nodes that experience the 
highest GICs suffer from the worst voltage drop. 
                                                           
1 The per-unit system (p.u.) is used in power system analysis to express values of voltages, currents powers and 
impedances of power equipment as fractions of a defined base quantity. In this report, we express voltage at 
nodes in (p.u) and relate voltage values to the base quantity of 400 kV.  
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Figure 18. Voltage magnitudes at the buses of the Scandinavian interconnected power network for the base 
case, |E| = 0 V/km (blue) and during the first event of collapse, |E| = 3.08 V/km (red). 
 
Figure 19. Voltage magnitudes comparison at the buses of the Scandinavian interconnected power network for 
the base case, |E| = 0 V/km (blue), during the first event of collapse |E| = 3.08 V/km (red) and during the peak 
value event, |E| = 20 V/km (green). 
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Figure 20. Comparison between GIC computed for scenario A, when |E|= 3.08 V/km (blue) and when |E| = 20 
V/km (green). The sign of the currents refers to the direction of the flow at the stations of the network: 
positive values are GICs exiting the nodes of system while negative values are GICs entering the nodes of the 
system.  
 
Figure 21 shows the reactive losses on lines during the base case and during the event of collapse 
corresponding to a field magnitude of |E|= 3.08 V/km. The highest losses correspond to the lines 
connecting power plants that deliver a high quantity of power to the system. The highest peak of 
reactive loss in Figure 21 corresponds to the line connecting to one of the biggest power plants in 
Sweden (1600 MW).  
Finally, Figure 22 shows that the highest reactive losses in transmission lines when |E| = 20 V/km 
correspond to the lines showing the highest losses also in the base-case scenario in the absence of 
an electric field (Figure 16). They are also the lines connecting the nodes with the highest 
geomagnetically induced currents (Figure 20).  
The last point to be analyzed concerns the intensity of the electric field during collapse. Our 
simulations indicate that no collapse occurs for Scenario B, which is characterized by a field peak 
value of |E| = 5 V/km. This may appear odd considering that for Scenario A several collapse events 
happen for |E| values lower than 5 V/km.  Figures 23, 24 and 25 compare the voltage, GICs and 
reactive losses for the case |E| = 3.08 V/km from Scenario A with the case |E| = 5 V/km from 
Scenario B. It can be clearly seen that the higher intensity of the geoelectric field induces the highest 
GICs in the system (Figure 24) but this is not a sufficient condition for the system to collapse. An 
important factor that contributes to determining if a system can withstand voltage drops is the 
interaction between the power flowing throughout the network and the effects of increased 
superimposed reactive power demand on the power flow. If the reactive power demand due to 
currents induced by the GMS allows the system to supply power within voltage and loss constraints 
at nodes and lines, the system is able to function and no collapse event is registered. On the other 
hand, if the reactive power demand happens to nodes and lines already working in the proximity of 
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limiting conditions, the system may not be able to fill the gap between its reactive generating 
capacities and the increased reactive power demand generated by GICs, causing its collapse. 
 
Figure 21. Transmission line losses of reactive power during ordinary operational mode (when |E| = 0 V/km) 
and during the first event of collapse, |E| = 3.08 V/km (red) (the unit of reactive losses is MVar or Mega Volt 
Ampere Reactive). 
 
Figure 22. Comparison of transmission line losses of reactive power during ordinary operational mode (when 
|E| = 0 V/km), during the first event of collapse, |E| = 3.08 V/km (red) and during the peak value event, |E| = 
20 V/km (green). 
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Figure 23. Voltage magnitudes comparison at the buses of the Scandinavian interconnected power network for 
the base case, |E| = 0 V/km (blue), during event of collapse |E| = 3.08 V/km (red) of Scenario A and during the 
peak value event, |E| = 5V/km (green) of Scenario B. 
 
Figure 24. Comparison between GIC calculated for Scenario A, when the |E|= 3.08 V/km (blue) and the GIC for 
Scenario B, when |E| = 5 V/km (green). The sign of the currents refers to the direction of the flow at the 
stations of the network: positive values are GICs exciting the nodes of system while negative values are GICs 
entering the nodes of the system.  
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Figure 25. Comparison of transmission line losses of reactive power during ordinary operational mode (when 
|E| = 0 V/km), during the first event of collapse, |E| = 3.08 V/km (red) for Scenario A, and during the peak 
value event, |E| = 5 V/km (green) for Scenario B. 
 
The overall results on voltages, GICs at nodes and losses for the 33 collapse events are summarized 
in Figures 26, 27 and 28 respectively. 
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Figure 26. Bus voltage variations during the 33 collapse events for Scenario A. Each rectangle represents an 
episode of collapse.  Bus voltages (on the y axis) are expressed in p.u. for every node of the system (x axis). The 
blue line represents the bus voltage, when there is no GMS, while the red line shows the voltage variations 
due to the GMS. Note that the vertical scales vary in the different subplots. 
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Figure 27. Representation of GIC values in the network nodes for each collapse event in the system for 
Scenario A. GICs, on the y-axis, are expressed in Ampere for every node.  Note that the vertical scales vary in 
the different subplots. 
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Figure 28. Representation of the reactive losses in the lines. Each rectangle is an episode of system collapse for 
Scenario A. The reactive losses, expressed in MVar on the y-axis, are represented for each line. The variation of 
the reactive losses during normal operational conditions (in blue) are represented against the variations 
caused by the GMS (red line). Note that the vertical scales very in the different subplots. 
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3.4.2.3  Case b) System with three-phase transformers 
The network configuration comprising three-phase transformer collapsed only in two events of 
scenario A. For both cases, the magnitude of the geoelectric field was extremely high. As expected, 
no collapse occurred during our simulation for the conditions of Scenario B. This is consistent with 
the observation that three–phase transformers are less vulnerable than mono-phase. 
The first collapse occurred when |E| = 14.8 V/km. Figures 29, 30 and 31 illustrate the trend for 
voltage, GIC at nodes and the losses of reactive power in lines. 
 
Figure 29. Bus voltage magnitudes for the base case with no GMS (blue) and in the presence of an electric field 
with magnitude |E| = 14.8 V/km. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 29, the system experiences a drastic voltage drop with respect to the 
base case. The nodes, and thus the transformers most affected by the GMS are situated in the 
southern part of Norway at nodes 139 and 140.  The related GICs per phase, featured in Figure 30, 
show that high values of induced currents are also present in other parts of the grid, for example at 
node 55 or at node 147. 
The second case of collapse for the three-phase transformer configuration of the network is the 
extreme event, corresponding to the highest geoelectric intensity |E| = 20 V/km.  Figures 32, 33 and 
34 show the behavior of the power system in such an event. In this case, the system experiences 
very high values of voltage (Fig. 32) at the nodes and also high intensity of GIC currents (Fig. 33). In 
this case, the lines register huge values of reactive loss which is characteristic for significant voltage 
collapse risks (Figure 34).  
The losses of reactive power on the lines indicate that in case of |E| = 20 kV/km, the central lines 
corresponding to Sweden, which are the longest ones, suffer from extremely high losses. For |E| = 
14 kV/km, the lines at the end of the graph, i.e. the lines corresponding to Norway, are the most 
affected by reactive power loss (Figure 34). 
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Figure 30. GIC per phase in the nodes of the Scandinavian network when the geoelectric field intensity is |E| = 
14.8 V/km. 
 
Figure 31. Reactive power losses in the transmission lines when the geoelectric field magnitude is |E| = 14.8 
V/km (red line) compared with line reactive power losses during normal operation regime, when |E| = 0 V/km 
(blue). 
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Figure 32. Bus voltage magnitudes for base case (blue) and for the electric field with magnitude |E| = 20 V/km. 
This is the highest intensity considered in the benchmark scenario developed by Pulkkinen et al. (2012). 
Figure 33. GIC per phase in the nodes of the Scandinavian Network when the geoelectric field intensity is |E| = 
20 V/km. 
35 
 
 
Figure 34. Reactive power losses in transmission lines when the geoelectric field magnitude is |E| = 20 V/km 
(red line), and reactive power losses in transmission lines during normal operations, i.e. |E| = 0 V/km (blue 
line).  
4. Discussion and conclusions 
Power grids can suffer outages or blackouts during geomagnetic storms. Transformers were 
identified as the most vulnerable components of the power networks: geomagnetically induced 
currents cause transformers to work in saturation regions generating voltage instability and 
eventually driving the system to collapse. 
In this report we extended our analysis from a scenario with uniform geoelectric field intensity to a 
time-varying scenario applied to the Scandinavian 400 kV interconnected power transmission grid. 
For this purpose we choose two extreme space-weather benchmark scenarios proposed in the 
literature. 
For our simulations we had to make some assumptions on the power grid model in the absence of 
detailed data. We assumed that every node of the grid includes a transformer of one of two 
different types: either transformers of the mono-phase type, the most vulnerable, or three-phase 
transformers, the most reliable type. We also did not consider any kind of protection system in 
place. We then calculated the GICs induced by the GMS scenarios to identify the nodes at which the 
system will experience the highest GICs. However, these GICs flow throughout the system obeying 
the power flow laws and to understand their impact on the network it is necessary to superimpose 
an AC power load flow to simulate the normal operating conditions of a power network. For this 
purpose, we considered a base-case load flow, representing one possible ordinary operational 
configuration of the system. 
Our simulations showed that the three-phase configuration of the network is significantly more 
robust than the mono-phase one. In case of extremely high electric field intensities (> 14 V/km) the 
system with mono-phase transformers collapses. Also the three-phase configuration is prone to 
collapse albeit with a much lower likelihood. For such an extreme event, the increase in reactive 
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power demand caused by transformer saturation is too high for the system to continue to provide 
power. For electric field values below 14 V/km our study shows that the system with the three-
phase transformer configuration is robust and no collapse occurs, while the mono-phase 
configuration is extremely vulnerable to GMS. In this latter case, it is shown how the power flow 
drives the voltage instabilities through the system: lines that experience higher losses during normal 
operation, for example lines connecting the nodes with a high concentration of power plants in the 
system, are more likely to increase losses during a GMS event and to drive the system towards 
collapse. According to our study, the portion of the Scandinavian interconnected power transmission 
grid most vulnerable to extreme space weather is the part where the highest reactive losses in 
transmission lines and in voltage magnitudes are observed. This corresponds to the southern parts 
of Sweden and Norway. 
As already indicated, for our study we had to make a number of simplifying assumptions to 
compensate for the lack of data especially on the power-grid configuration, but also to keep the 
simulations manageable from a computational point of view. Our primary assumption concerning 
transformer type and distribution in the grid should be revisited if detailed information becomes 
available as it is unlikely that every node includes one transformer and that transformer types are 
the same throughout the entire network. In a realistic network there will be nodes with multiple 
transformers and different transformer designs. Considering only one- or three-phase transformers, 
our current study analysed two extreme cases with worst-case and best-case assumptions. Along the 
same lines, load-flow regimes different from the base case could be modelled. A more realistic 
network configuration can be implemented easily into our analysis should the data become 
available. Transformer ageing due to cumulative space-weather effects, as well as the impact of 
harmonics in the network are also not commonly modelled. 
In the near future this study will be extended to assess the risk of extreme space weather for larger 
portions of the EU power grid. In the medium term this work will also feed into the Joint Research 
Centre’s Global Resilience and Risk Assessment Platform (GRRASP) which we will use to estimate 
cascading effects to Society due to potential power-grid failure by extreme space weather and its 
interdependencies with other types of critical infrastructure (Azzini et al., 2014). 
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